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EU Age Control apps: Privacy-preserving age verification or a trojan horse for digital ID infrastructure?

By

gasull

1mo ago· 14 min readenInsight

Summary

This article critically examines the EU Age Control system, arguing that despite being marketed as a privacy-preserving age verification tool using zero-knowledge proofs, it functions as a trojan horse for broader digital ID infrastructure. The author identifies three key problems: (1) the DSA fallback allows platforms to use standard KYC providers instead of the privacy-preserving wallet, (2) attestation lock-in where Google and Apple control what attestations are accepted, and (3) technical flaws including relay attacks that the protocol cannot stop. The piece highlights a significant gap between the marketed cryptography and what is actually shipped, warning that the system paves the way for mandatory digital IDs under the guise of age verification.

Key quotes

· 5 pulled
Most people think EU Age Control apps are about identifying users. The sales pitch is all zero-knowledge proofs of age.
First: the DSA fallback — platforms don't actually need the privacy-preserving wallet; the rules let them use a normal KYC provider instead.
Second: attestation lock-in — Google and Apple decide what attestations are accepted.
The gap between marketed and shipped cryptography raises serious concerns about the system's actual privacy guarantees.
Relay attacks the protocol can't stop undermine the security claims of the entire system.
Snippet from the RSS feed
A technical look at the EU age verification reference app — the gap between marketed and shipped cryptography, relay attacks the protocol can't stop, and why the 'privacy-preserving' system is a trojan horse for digital ID infrastructure.

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