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Limitations and improvements of chain rules for conditional entropies in quantum cryptography security proofs

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[Submitted on 28 May 2026]

2d ago· 2 min readenInsight

Summary

This article discusses chain rules for conditional entropies in quantum cryptography, which are essential for security proofs against general eavesdropper attacks. The authors identify a limitation in the device-independent (DI) setting, showing that a natural tightening of an existing chain rule cannot hold. However, they prove a new chain rule that provides intermediate improvement, leading to a tighter version of the Rényi Entropy Accumulation Theorem (EAT) in certain contexts. The paper also provides a unified framework comparing existing chain rules and their applications.

Key quotes

· 5 pulled
Security proofs in quantum cryptography rely on conditional entropies.
Chain rules address this problem by relating the conditional entropy of a structured, but non-i.i.d. process to a sum of entropy contributions from each round.
Surprisingly, we show that a natural tightening of the chain rule of Dupuis et al. that would answer this question affirmatively cannot hold, highlighting a limitation of the current DI security proof approach.
Nonetheless, we show that an intermediate improvement is possible by proving a new chain rule in this setting.
In addition, we provide a self-contained framework that unifies existing chain rules and compares their applications, framing our results in a broader context.
Snippet from the RSS feed
Security proofs in quantum cryptography rely on conditional entropies. In a many-round protocol, their estimation is a challenging task; one must account for the most general attacks by an eavesdropper, including those that are not independently and ident

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